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Miller: Tax Litigation

COMMENTS
CAN THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS
ADMINISTRATIVE CONDUCT?
THE I.R.C. SECTION 7430 FEE RECOVERY
CONTROVERSY
I. INTRODUCTION

When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) takes an unreasonable position regarding liability for past income tax, a taxpayer may find him or herself in a double bind. He or she may
find that it is less expensive to simply concede the alleged liability than to defend against it. The IRS has the power to set in
motion draconian collection measures if the taxpayer fails to
take immediate defensive action. l Therefore the taxpayer is
forced to either concede or enter into the Internal Revenue Service's lengthy and expensive administrative appeals process. 2
When a tax professional is hired to represent the taxpayer
in the appeal, fees are added and costs continue to climb. Nevertheless, when the taxpayer finally files suit to resolve the disputed liability, he or she may find the result disillusioning. Depending upon the court and jurisdiction in which the suit is
The author would like to thank Karen L. Hawkins of Taggart & Hawkins, San Francisco, California, for her expertise and assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. For an explanation of Internal Revenue Service collection measures see M. SALTZMAN, IRS Practice And Procedure, 14-1 - 14-45 (1981 & Supp. 1987). The Internal Revenue Service is the only creditor in the United States which may attach a putative
debtor's property and begin collection without first obtaining a court order. Thus in the
tax debt situation, payment comes before defense, and the burden of proof, ordinarily
borne by the creditor, is shifted to the taxpayer/debtor. [d. at 14-4.
2. For an extensive discussion on Internal Revenue Service administrative appeals
procedures, see M. SALTZMAN, supra note I, at Chapters 8 (The Examination Function)
and 9 (The Appeals Function) (1981 & Supp. 1987).
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filed, the taxpayer may not be able to recover the fees and costs
incurred in defending against any unreasonable position taken
by the Service. 3 In some jurisdictions, the courts have, in effect,
held that the IRS can adopt an unreasonable position, force a
taxpayer through the administrative appeals process and then
concede without incurring liability for the taxpayer's fees and
costs once a legal action is filed.'
This result is currently possible due to the controversy surrounding the interpretation of Internal Revenue Code section
7430 (hereinafter section 7430).11 As originally enacted in 1982,
3. The Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals, as well as the
Tax Court, have interpreted fee recovery statutes narrowly and have awarded few litigation costs to prevailing taxpayers. See infra text accompanying notes 118-155. See also,
Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (taxpayer's petition for
fees pursuant to IRC section 7430 denied); Ewing v. Heye, 803 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986)
(same); Walsh v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5370 (D. Minn. 1985) (same); Contini v. United States, 55 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 419 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same); Brazil v. United
States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5707 (D. Or. 1984) (same); Zielinski v. United States, 54
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 5132 (D. Minn. 1984) (same); Eidson v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 841 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (same).
In contrast, the First and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as many of the
district courts, have interpreted fee recovery statutes broadly and have been more inclined to award taxpayers fees in the face of the government's unreasonable conduct. See
infra text accompanying notes 49-88. See also, Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding the administrative position immediately prior to litigation is
subject to scrutiny for reasonableness); Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985)
(holding that governmental conduct throughout the administrative process should be examined); Finney v. Roddy, 617 F.Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1985) (same); Roggeman v. United
States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 119473 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (same); Rosenbaum v. Internal
Revenue Service, 615 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Va. 1984) (same); Penner v. United States, 584
F.Supp. 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same); Hallam v. Murphy, 586 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(same). For a general discussion of the "American Rule" of fee shifting and its progression in tax litigation, see Comment, Award of Attorney Fees in Tax Litigation, 19 VAL.
U.L. REV. 153 (1984).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 118-155. See also Baker v. Commissioner, 787
F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding the court may only consider the reasonableness of the government's position in the civil proceeding, not in the underlying administrative procedure); Ewing v. Heye 803 F.2d at 613 (same); Walsh, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
at 5370 (same); Contini, 55 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 419 (same); Brazil, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H)
at 5707 (same); Zielinski, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 5132 (same); Eidson, 53 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) at 841 (same).
5. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (amended by the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 1551(a)-(g), 1152(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752-53) was passed as part of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-248, (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
7430 (Supp. 1985) (amended 1986)) and provided in pertinent part:
Awarding of court costs and certain fees.
In the case of any civil proceeding which is (1) brought' by or against the United States in connection
with the determination, collection or refund of any tax, inter-
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section 7430 provided for the award of attorneys' fees and costs6
to a taxpayer in a case brought against the United States when
the taxpayer had "substantially prevail[ed]"7 and the government's "position ... in the civil proceeding was unreasonable, ..
. ."8 The difficulty in interpretation stems from the discrepancy
between the statute's language and its legislative history.9
Prior to the passage of section 7430, a taxpayer who prevailed in a tax case in a district court could petition for fees and
costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2412(d)(1)(A), the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA).lo EAJA mandated that
est or penalty under this title, and
(2) brought in a court of the United States, (including the
Tax Court and the United States Claims Court), the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment for reasonable litigation
costs incurred in such proceeding.
7430(c)(2)(A). The term "prevailing party" means any
party to any proceeding described in [7430(a») ... which (i) establishes that the position of the United States in
the civil proceeding was unreasonable, and
(ii) (I) has substantially prevailed with respect to the
amount in controversy, or
(II) has substantially prevailed with respect to the
most significant issue or set of issues presented (emphasis
added).
The first portion of this article deals with cases which were decided under § 7430
prior to its amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Therefore all references to §
7430 are to the prior statute unless otherwise indicated. For a discussion of the effects of
this amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 182-194.
6. Section 7430 includes reasonable attorneys' fees within the term "costs." 26
U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 1986).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i)(l) (Supp. 1986) (amended by the 1986 TRA see
supra note 5). To be considered a "prevailing party" under the statute, the taxpayer
must first have substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy or as to
the main issue in the suit. [d. Second, the taxpayer must prove that the government's
position was unreasonable. [d. This two-pronged definition of "prevailing party" eliminates the presumption that the taxpayer is automatically eligible for recovery of costs if
the United States loses the case. See H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 11
(1981) ; 127 CONGo REC. 32070, 32077 (1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 404).
Congress intended that the government "should not necessarily be penalized for the reasonable pursuit of debatable tax issues. Tax administration would be ineffective if the
Government conceded all close cases to the taxpayer in order to avoid payment of fee
awards." Description of Law and Bills Relating to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Tax
Cases, Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1984).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) (26 U.S.C. § 7430 is referred to hereinafter as I.R.C. § 7430).
9. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
10. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in scattered United States
Code Sections, including Titles 5, 28, and 48). EAJA was enacted to expand the liability
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courts award fees and costs to the prevailing taxpayer if the government's position was not "substantially justified."ll
When Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, it added section 7430 intending it as the controlling statute for attorneys' fee awards in all tax cases, regardless of the forum chosen.1 2 EAJA was never applicable to cases
brought in the United States Tax Court because EAJA, as a Title 28 statute, pertained exclusively to courts established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution. IS The
United States Tax Court was established under Article I of the
Constitution. a Therefore, a taxpayer who sued in a Federal district court or the United States Claims Court could recover fees
pursuant to EAJA, but a taxpayer who sued in the Tax Court
could not. lll Congress intended section 7430 to remedy this inequity and provide for "one set of rules [to] apply to awards of
litigation costs in tax cases whether the action is brought in a
U.S. district court, the Court of Claims, or the U.S. Tax
Court."16
Section 7430 provides/ 7 in general, that in any civil tax proceeding against the United States, a prevailing party, other than
of the United States for attorneys' fees and other expenses in all governmental administrative proceedings and civil actions. In this way Congress intended to encourage citizens
with legitimate causes of action to litigate against the United States regardless of their
financial circumstances. Any citizen who prevails in a dispute with any official or agency
of the government may petition the court for fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (e)(2)(C).
If the government cannot prove that its position was substantially justified, the court
must award the fees unless special circumstances make the award unjust. H.R. REP. No.
120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4-8 (1985).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1987). Amended Aug. 5 1985, Pub. L. No. 9980, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D». See also H.R. REP.
No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. supra note 10, at 11.
12. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324, 572-74 (1982) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7430 (Supp. 1985»; see also
H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
13. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (bankruptcy courts are non-Article III courts and therefore Title 28 is not applicable). See also Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966) (holding that the tax court is a non-Article III court and
instead is a Article I legislative court). See also H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 12 n.1.
15. See supra note 13.
16. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
17. I.R.C. § 7430 was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See supra note 5.
The current dollar limitation for attorneys' fee awards under § 7430 is $75.00 per hour.
For a discussion of the changes made in § 7430 by the TRA, See infra note 183.
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the United States, may be awarded reasonable litigation costS. 18
A "prevailing party" as defined by section 7430, is a party who
has substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy19 or as to the most significant issue[s] presented. 20 Additionally, the prevailing party must have established that the
"position of the United States in the civil proceeding was unreasonable."21 A costs award under section 7430 includes reasonable
court costs, attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and any necessary studies, engineering reports, tests or projects. 22
The section's legislative history reveals that it was added to
the tax code to "deter abusive actions or overreaching by the
Internal Revenue Service and [to] enable individual taxpayers to
vindicate their rights regardless of individual circumstances."23
This statement demonstrates a recognition of the power the IRS
wields and its potential for abuse. It also demonstrates Congressional awareness of the comparatively ineffective position occupied by a taxpayer facing the IRS bureaucracy. The legislative
history, however, makes it clear that section 7430 was not
designed to open the floodgates for fee recovery from the IRS.24
To provide some protection against a perceived flood of frivolous
claims, Congress limited the awarding of fees under section 7430
to those cases where the government acted "unreasonably."211 In
contrast, to recover fees under EAJA, the government's conduct
must be "not substantially justified."26 Additionally, Congress
placed the taxpayer suing under section 7430 at a disadvantage
by imposing the burden of proving the unreasonableness of the
government's position upon the taxpayer. 27 EAJA places on the
government the affirmative burden of proving that its conduct
was substantially justified. 28
18. I.R.C. § 7430(a). Awards under § 7430 before its 1986 amendment were limited
to $25,000. I.R.C. § 7430(B)(1).
19. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(a)(ii)(I) (Supp. 1985).
20. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(a)(ii)(II) (Supp. 1985).
21. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985). See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at
11.
22. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1) (Supp. 1985).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
24. [d.
25. [d. See also I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e)(3) (Supp. 1987).
27. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) (Supp. 1987).
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As another safeguard to keep claims from proliferating, the
legislation requires that a taxpayer suing for fees must have "exhausted the administrative remedies" available before he or she
is eligible for recovery.29 This requirement is designed to encourage taxpayers to resolve tax disputes without litigation. 80
The administrative appeals process, however, is lengthy, complicated and vulnerable to abuse by IRS agents. 81 Because of the
complexity and intimidating nature of the appeals procedure,
many taxpayers obtain professional assistance. Nevertheless, the
Ways and Means Committee, in its report on section 7430,
stated that:
The committee intends that the costs of preparing and filing the petition or complaint which
commences a civil tax action be the first of any
recoverable attorney's fees. Fees paid or incurred
for the services of an attorney during the administrative stages of the case could not be recoverable under an award of litigation costs. B2

Given the committee's stated intent that section 7430 "deter abus[e] [and] overreaching"88 by the IRS, it is difficult to
understand this apparent prohibition against awarding attorneys' fees for services performed while in the administrative appeals process. 8• The abuse and harassment which section 7430
was enacted to deter is more likely to occur during the administrative process 811 and, may be what ultimately causes taxpayers
29. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985). See also H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 13.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
31. [d.
32. [d. at 14.
33. [d. at 11.
34. See I.R.C. § 7430 (b)(2) (Supp. 1985); H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
35. The committee implicitly recognized this fact when it presented the factors to
be taken into account when a court is considering awarding fees:
(1) whether the government used the costs and expenses of
litigation against its position to extract concessions from the
taxpayer that were not justified under the circumstances of
the case, (2) whether the government pursued the litigation
against the taxpayer for purposes of harassment or embarrassment, or out of political motivation, and (3) such other factors
as the court finds relevant.
H.R. REP. No. 404 supra note 7, at 12.
While these particular abuses could conceivably occur after the filing of the civil
action, the most likely time the IRS is going to "extract concessions" or unreasonably
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to file suit. Given a literal reading of the committee report, either the only abuses which can be punished are those occurring
after an action is filed, or there are contradictions in the intent,
goals and requirements of section 7430.
II. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The ambiguities present in section 7430's legislative history
have made judicial interpretation a difficult task. Therefore, no
consistent interpretation has occurred to date. 36 The First, Fifth
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals37 have rejected the notion
that the IRS is not accountable for unreasonable conduct which
occurs prior to "litigation." They have found it to be unacceptable and contrary to legislative intent. 38 Thus, some courts have
held that the pre litigation conduct of the IRS can be considered
in fee awards. 39 This approach is consistent with the legislative
intent to deter abuse, because abuses can occur at the administrative leve1. 40
In contrast, the Eleventh and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that pre litigation conduct may
not be considered when awarding fees. 41 These courts support
their position with a strict interpretation of the statutory language and the above-quoted passage from the committee
"pursue" the litigation for harassment purposes, is during settlement negotiations, prior
to the filing of the suit. See Comment, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still a WinLose Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 486 (1984) (discussing the committee's suggested
factors to be taken in account when awarding fees). Such actions would force taxpayers
to settle their dispute at the administrative level to avoid the cost and aggravation or
embarrassment of litigating against the government. H.R. REP. No. 404 supra note 7, at
12.
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See infra text accompanying notes 3742.
37. Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding the administrative position immediately prior to litigation is subject to scrutiny for reasonableness);
Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that governmental conduct
throughout the administrative process should be examined); Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839
F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that prelitigation administrative conduct should be
examined for reasonableness).
38. [d. See infra text accompanying notes 49-88.
39. See supra note 37.
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Ewing v. Heye, 803
F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986). See also supra note 3.
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report.· 2
The area which may generate the most controversy when
dealing with section 7430 is the "last known address" case scenario.· 8 The last known address situation appears when the IRS
attempts to notify a taxpayer of an alleged deficiency by mailing
a statutory deficiency notice to an address where the taxpayer
neither lives nor receives mail.·· The taxpayer never receives the
notice and the statutory time to respond runs out.·Ii Thus in last
known address cases the statutory notices fail to reach the taxpayer and the IRS begins collection without the taxpayer ever
being notified of the alleged deficiency.·& When the taxpayer
learns of the alleged deficiency, collection efforts have already
begun, and the taxpayer's only options are to file suit asking for
an injunction to halt the collection procedures or to file a Tax
Court petition.· 7 Because the taxpayer never knew about the administrative proceedings, he or she never attempted to exhaust
the administrative remedies. Therefore, the taxpayer cannot
comply with the technical requirements of section 7430. 4 &

A.

FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

The First Circuit, in Kaufman v. Egger,·9 held that prelitigation conduct may be considered by the court when assessing
the reasonableness of the government's conduct. liD The court
found that the government's conduct in dealing with the
Kaufmans was unreasonable by any standard.IiI
The government's initial contact with the Kaufmans was to
send an audit notice to a former address approximately one year
42. See supra text accompanying note 32.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 52-56.
44. I.R.C. § 6212 (1986) requires that the Statutory Notice of Deficiency be sent to
the taxpayer's last known address. See also M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 10-12 - 10-13 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
45. See generally text accompanying notes 52-56.
46.Id.
47. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
48. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(2) (1986) requires that administrative remedies be exhausted
before a taxpayer is eligible to recover costs under the section.
49. 758 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
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after they had moved. 1I2 When the Kaufmans failed to appear at
the audit, the IRS assessed a tax of $14,380. 113 The IRS mailed
both a Notice of Proposed Adjustment and the Statutory Notice
of Deficiency to an address where the Kaufmans had never
lived. II" In 1983, the IRS notified the Kaufmans that their 1982
tax refund had been seized to pay some of the prior tax liability.1I11 Subsequently, they received a notice instructing them to
contact the local IRS to arrange for installment payments on
their remaining liability.1I6
Thereafter, the Kaufmans filed suit in the United States
district court for injunctive relief and for the return of their
1982 refund. 1I7 Two months after the Kaufmans filed their suit,
the IRS stipulated to the issuance of a permanent injunction
prohibiting it from any further collection activity based on the
invalidly issued Deficiency Notice. 1I8 The district court awarded
the Kaufmans attorneys' fees and the IRS appealed. 1I9
The First Circuit stated that the Kaufmans' situation was
an example of the "unnecessary tribulations that can be brought
to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by today's computerized
bureaucracy."6o The court went on to make it clear that taxpayers need not absorb the costs of initiating a suit that, but for the
unreasonable conduct of the IRS, they would never have filed. 61
52. [d. at 2.
53. [d.
54. [d. Eleven days later the IRS acknowledged its error and noted in the
Kaufmans' file that the Statutory Deficiency Notice had been sent to the wrong address.
During this same time, the IRS was corresponding with the Kaufmans at their correct
address, on another unrelated tax matter. [d. at 2 n.2. This situation typifies the "last
known address" case. See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
55. Kaufman, 759 F.2d at 2.
56. [d.
57. [d. The government argued that the Kaufmans had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the IRS as required by § 7430(b)(2) (Supp. 1985) because
they had immediately filed suit. [d. The court held that the Kaufmans were not precluded from receiving an award of costs, because the alleged deficiency had already been
referred to collections. [d. at 3. Moreover, the court found that the Kaufmans fell within
an exception to that requirement set forth in a treasury regulation (26 C.F.R. § 301.7430I-f(3)(ii)(1986)), and therefore the IRS, through its own regulations, exempted the
Kaufmans from that requirement. Kaufman, 758 F.2d at 2-3.
58. [d at 2.
59. [d.
60. [d. at 1.
61. [d. at 1-2. "The present case zeros in on one of many unnecessary tribulations
that can be brought to bear upon the unsuspecting citizenry by todays' computerized
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The court stated that the intent of Congress in passing section
7430 was, an attempt to "grant the public some relief from such
bungling. "611
The main issue before the court was whether the government's behavior prior to the institution of litigation could be
considered in determining the unreasonableness of its behavior
in the section 7430 context. After acknowledging the split on the
issue in the opinions to date, the First Circuit held that prelitigation conduct may be considered because "it is in keeping with
Congress' remedial bias in enacting this statute."63 The court
concluded that the district court did not err in scrutinizing the
government's prelitigation conduct to determine its reasonableness. 64 While stating that the conduct of the IRS in the Kaufman case was "unreasonable by any standard, "611 the court did
not articulate any definitive test for unreasonableness. Instead,
the court simply stated that interpreting section 7430 in any
other way would frustrate Congressional intent. 66 Thus, the controlling interpretation of section 7430 in the First Circuit is that
taxpayer entitlement to fees is triggered by unreasonable IRS
conduct, regardless of the stage in the proceedings.67
B.

FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS

The Fifth Circuit's entry into the section 7430 controversy
came with Powell v. Commissioner.68 In Powell, the taxpayer received an assessment on an uncontested 1976 liability with the
understanding that collection would be curtailed until the audit
of an underlying tax shelter was completed. 69 To protect its position for the 1977 year, the IRS issued a statutory notice using
an alternate theory with respect to the indebtedness connected
with the tax shelter.70 Taxpayer filed a petition for the 1977
year. Ultimately the parties settled the dispute for both the 1977
bureaucracy." Kaufman, 758 F2d. at 1.
62. Id. at 1·2.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 4.
66.Id.
67.Id.
68. 791 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 386·87.
70. Id. at 387.
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and 1976 years by stipulating to a $15,000 deficiency for the
1976 year and a dismissal of the 1977 case.71 Powell's position in
seeking attorneys' fees was that the government was unreasonable in issuing the 1977 statutory notice before he had an opportunity to address the 1976 settlement ofI'er. 72
The Fifth Circuit, analyzing section 7430 and analogizing its
parallel EAJA provisions,7s held that the conduct of the IRS at
the time the suit was filed should be examined to ascertain the
reasonableness of the government's conduct. 74 The test is in the
nature of a proximate cause test.711 The court reasoned that if
unreasonable IRS conduct proximately caused the taxpayer to
file suit and if the other prerequisites of section 7430 were met,
the taxpayer could recover fees. 76 The court went on to justify
this perspective by stating that "[t]his reading of section 7430
allows tax litigants to recover the costs of a civil proceeding they
never should have been required to initiate."77
The most intriguing part of the Fifth Circuit's opinion is its
use of EAJA as an interpretative guide. The court began its
comparison by noting that section 7430 "by and large places taxpayers at a disadvantage. "76 The opinion went on to directly
analogize to EAJA, despite its much lighter burden of proof on
the citizen litigating against the government. 79 The court reasoned that the shifting of the burden of proof to the taxpayer
was enough of a disadvantage, making the additional disadvantage of narrowly interpreting the language of the statute
unnecessary.80
In acknowledging the parallels between EAJA and section
7430, the court reasoned that the legislative intent behind them
was similar.81 It held that "Congress' retroactive interpretation
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 387-88.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982) (repealed 1984).
Powell, 791 F.2d at 391-92.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 390-91.
80. Id. at 390.
81. Id. at 390-91.
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of the phrase ['position of the United States'] in EAJA should
be equally applicable to section 7430, even though Congress
amended only EAJA .... "82
The Fifth Circuit formulated an appealing rationale for examining pre litigation conduct when awarding fees. It reasoned
that if an administrative position adopted by the IRS forced a
taxpayer to file an action, it would be incongruous for section
7430 to require courts to ignore the unreasonable position underlying the taxpayer's action. 83
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Powell is not as broad as the
First Circuit's opinion in Kaufman. The Powell court saw a need
to examine only the highest administrative position adopted by
the government immediately prior to the filing of the taxpayer's
suit. 8 • If that administrative position was unreasonable and
proximately caused the litigation, then a court may award fees
and costS. 811
In contrast, the Kaufman court examined the conduct of
the IRS throughout the administrative proceedings. 86 It held
that if the government's conduct was unreasonable, regardless of
the stage in the proceedings, the taxpayer could recover fees. 87
This holding ignores the legislature's obvious concern regarding
the case load of the Tax Court. 88 It also places an additional
burden on the judiciary. Instead of merely scrutinizing the government's position immediately prior to the filing of the taxpayer's action, courts in the First Circuit must study the administrative conduct of the IRS throughout the proceedings.
82. [d. In 1985, Congress amended EAJA to make it clear that the "position of the
United States" included "the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil
action is based." Act of Aug. 5. 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)(1987».

83. Powell, 791 F.2d at 391.
84. [d. at 392.

85. [d.

86. See supra text accompanying note 67.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
88. See HR REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS

The Ninth Circuit recently took the opportunity to interpret section 7430 in the case of Sliwa u. Commissioner.89 Sliwa
was a last known address case 90 where there was substantial legal activity between the issuance of a first invalid notice of deficiency, the issuance of a second, valid, notice of deficiency and
the filing of a Tax Court petition. 91
After the petition was filed the case went to the Appeals
Division for settlement negotiations. 92 At a hearing in September of 1985 the Tax Court took Sliwa's request for formal discovery under advisement. 9s Thereafter the Commissioner conceded all the issues in the case and, in November of 1985,
stipulated to a dismissal of the Notice of Deficiency.9. Petitioner
then requested that the court award litigation costs under section 7430. 911 The Tax Court denied the motion and Sliwa appealed. 98 The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, as a case
of first impression regarding statutory interpretation. 97
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion with an overview of
the other circuits' interpretations of the statute. 98 After comparing the reasoning behind the differing interpretations of the
statute, the Ninth Circuit stated that a restrictive interpretation
of the phrase "in the civil proceeding" would "undermin[e] the
legislative intent ... "99 of the statute.
The Ninth Circuit, like the Powell and Kaufman courts,
held that prelitigation administrative conduct could be scrutinized for unreasonableness when determining whether or not to
award fees against the government. IOO It reasoned that "[i]f the

o

89. 839 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. [d. at 603.
91. [d. at 603-604.
92. [d. at 604.
93. [d.
94. [d.
95. [d. at 604-605.
96., [d. at 605.
97: [d.
98. [d. at 606-607.
99. [d. at 607.
100. [d.
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conduct of the government at later administrative levels is unreasonable, it stands to reason that the position of the government in defending in the civil proceeding in the first place may
be unreasonable as well if based upon that conduct."lol Significantly, the Ninth Circuit echoed the Powell court's analysis regarding unreasonable administrative positions at higher levels. l02
The statement above largely paraphrases the "proximate cause"
analysis utilized in Powell. lOS If the government's unreasonable
conduct causes a taxpayer to file suit, the government should be
liable for the costs the taxpayer incurred in bringing that suit. l04
An important distinction between the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sliwa and the decisions in Kaufman and Powell is that
the Ninth Circuit bifurcated the issues of reasonableness and fee
recovery.101i The Ninth Circuit held that unreasonable conduct
triggered the provisions of section 7430, regardless of the stage
in the proceedings. loe However, the court also held that only the
"costs and fees actually incurred in and after preparing and filing the petition in the tax court, were recoverable under the
statute. "107 This distinction is significant, first, because it fulfills
the goals set out in the legislative historyl08 and second, because
it maintains the narrow focus of section 7430's statutory
language. l09
In a footnote,l1o the Ninth Circuit indicated that they believed that this interpretation of section 7430 was in accord with
the amendment of section 7430 by the Tax Reform Act of
1986. 111 The court conceded that the 1986 amendment of section
7430 did not control in Sliwa but stated that it "shed light" on
the intent of Congress in passing the statute. ll2 Thus, the Ninth
101. [d.
102. [d. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
103. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
104. [d. See also Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607.
105. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. The court held that unreasonable administrative behavior triggered cost recovery, but that only costs incurred in and after preparing the petition could be recovered. [d.
106. [d.
107. [d.
108. See supra text accompanying note 23.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
110. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607 n.6.
111. [d. See also infra notes 182-189 and accompanying text.
112. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607 n.6.
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Circuit's interpretation of section 7430 should not change dramatically when applying the amended statute.1l3
In contrast, the Kaufman and Powell courts did not delineate the point at which taxpayers could recover fees for representation during the administrative process, if the position of the
IRS was unreasonable.lH Both courts treated the reasonableness
and threshold of recovery issues as a single issue.llII In doing so,
they interpreted the statute very broadly, and failed to take into
consideration the narrow focus of the statute's language. lIS The
Ninth Circuit's decision adopts the analytical approach
presented by the Fifth Circuit in Powell and refines it in an attempt to comport with the statute's narrow language. ll7
D.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS

The District of Columbia interpreted section 7430 much
more narrowly when it decided Baker v. Commissioner. us In
Baker, the taxpayer, who worked in Saudi Arabia, was required
to live in restricted quarters. ll9 Baker took an exclusion from his
gross income for those quarters, as allowed by section 911 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 120
In 1982, the IRS audited Baker's returns, along with those
of two taxpayers in identical situations.121 The IRS disallowed
Baker's exclusion, while dismissing the cases against the
others.122 Baker informed the IRS of the identical cases and of
their results. 123 The Appeals Office denied that the outcome of
the other identical cases had any bearing upon Baker's situation. 124 Soon after Baker hired an attorney and filed a petition in
113. Id.
114. See, Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) and Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385, 391-392 (5th Cir. 1986).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 and 83-85.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.
117. Sliwa 839 F.2d at 607.
118. 787 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
119. Id. at 638-39.
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 639-40.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 640.
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Tax Court, the IRS signed a stipulation which acknowledged
that its disallowance of Baker's exclusion was wrong. 12 & Baker
then requested, pursuant to section 7430, that the Tax Court
award him the costs he incurred in bringing his suit. 126
The District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court held that
only the reasonableness of the "position of the United States in
the civil proceeding [commenced by Baker's petition]" should be
considered when deciding whether or not to award costS. 127 The
court concluded that the language and legislative history of section 7430 both mandated that recovery of costs begin only after
litigation had begun. 128
In reaching its conclusion the D.C. Circuit looked to EAJA
for guidance in interpreting section 7430.129 Unlike the Fifth
Circuit, however, this court distinguished EAJA, stating that the
congressional amendment of EAJA in 1985, which broadened
the language,130 evidenced the congressional intent that section
7430 have "a focus narrower than EAJA's."131 The court then
stated that it believed the test articulated in Spencer v.
NLRB,132 ironically, an EAJA case, should guide the disposition
of fees under section 7430. 133 The Spencer test provides that
when a petitioner has been subjected to atypically harsh treatment, the government must produce a particularly strong justification for its position.1 3•
This test ignores the burden of proof requirement of section
7430, which clearly places the taxpayer in the position of proving
that the government's position was unreasonable. 131i Thus in the
D.C. Circuit, courts addressing fee awards in tax cases must determine whether the taxpayer has been subjected to "atypically
harsh treatment."136 If the court is satisfied that the IRS has
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 644.
[d. at 641.
[d. at 641-42.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See supra note 82.
Baker, 787 F.2d at 641-42 n.8.
712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984).
Baker, 787 F.2d at 643.
[d. (citing Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561).
135. Baker, 787 F.2d at 643. See also, LR.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985).
136. Baker, 787 F.2d at 643 (citing Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561).
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sufficiently abused the taxpayer, the burden to produce a "particularly strong" justification for its actions shifts to the government.137 This analysis is quite unlike that used in any other jurisdiction for section 7430 questions.

E.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS

In Ewing v. Heye,t38 the Eleventh Circuit decided the case
of a taxpayer who could not convince the IRS to release a lien. 139
The taxpayer had satisfied the obligation secured by the lien,
but the government had not released it, despite the statutory
requirement that such a lien be released within thirty days of
satisfaction.l'o When the taxpayer filed suit, the government investigated its case and promptly conceded. l41
The taxpayer then requested reimbursement for the costs
incurred in both the administrative proceedings and in bringing
its suit in the district court.142 The district court denied the taxpayer's request because the government had acted reasonably
since the petitioner filed his complaint. l43 It conceded its case. I . .
The district court held that administrative proceedings were not
the civil proceedings referenced by section 7430. IU
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the taxpayer conceded
that "costs and attorneys [sic] fees may not be awarded for prelitigation administrative proceedings."l46 Therefore, the main issue before the court of appeals should have been whether the
district court properly found the in-court litigating posture of
the IRS to be reasonable. m Instead, the court stated, "[t]he sole
question before the court is whether the district judge correctly
137. Id.
138. 803 F.2d 613 (lIth Cir. 1986)
139. Id. at 614.
140. 26 U.S.C. § 6325{a){l) (1967 and Supp. 1987) (requiring that IRS liens be released within thirty days of satisfaction).
141. Ewing, 803 F.2d at 614.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 614 n.l (citing Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-4).
147. Id.
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determined that the government's position in the administrative
proceedings could not be examined to determine the reasonableness of the government's position 'in the civil proceeding.' "148
The court went on to discuss the differences in interpretation of section 7430 among the circuits. It concluded that "the
denial of attorneys' fees and costs in the instant case may well
be 'unfair,' "In but that nevertheless section "7430 as drafted by
Congress, does not allow for such an award."lI1O The court held
that they could not scrutinize administrative conduct occurring
prior to the filing of a legal action or award fees incurred during
such an administrative proceeding.lIil While this holding was unnecessary to determine the issues presented in the case, it is
nevertheless the controlling precedent for the Eleventh Circuit.
The Ewing court criticized the Kaufman and Powell decisions as attempts to judicially amend an imperfectly drafted
statute. 1112 While sympathetic to the plight of taxpayers forced
into administrative appeals proceedings, the opinion states that
"Congress would have been explicit if it had intended to provide
attorney fee relief for proceedings prior to the 'civil proceedings.' "l11S The opinion criticizes the analysis in Powell, stating
that Powell's use of the 1985 amendment of EAJA to infer Congressional intent that section 7430 apply to administrative proceedings was "totally unconvincing."1114 Yet, neither the Eleventh Circuit in Ewing nor the D.C. Circuit in Baker give a
reasonable explanation as to how Congress expected to "deter
abusive overreaching"lli1i by the IRS, if it also intended to limit
awards of fees and costs to cases of in-court unreasonableness.
III.

ANAL YSIS

The examples of unreasonable conduct outlined by Congress
in its Committee Reports are much more likely to occur prior to
148. [d.
149. [d. at 616.

150.
151.
152.
153.

[d.
[d. 615-16.
[d. at 616.
[d. at 615 (citing the district court order at 2-3).

154. [d.

155. See H.R.

REP.

No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
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the filing of a suit. 168 Nevertheless, the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have been willing to abandon the goal of vindicating taxpayers' rights and deterring IRS abuses 167 by adhering to a strict
interpretation of section 7430.168 They have largely ignored the
the factors the committee suggested be taken into account when
considering awarding fees,169 and have failed to explain how
such factors might arise in an in-court proceeding.
An additional question not dealt with by the Baker and Ewing opinions is the language in the statute which immediately
proceeds the controversial language "position of the United
States in a civil proceeding."18o Section 7430(c)(2)(B)(3) states:
"The term 'civil proceeding' includes a civil action."181 Both the
Eleventh 182 and D.C.183 Circuits seem to have assumed that
"civil proceeding" was synonymous with "civil action." However,
if the terms mean the same thing, it is somewhat odd for Congress to have included them both.
Another pertinent inquiry in this regard is, if a civil action
is included within the term "civil proceeding," what else is included in the term?184 Given the subsequent amendments to section 7430 to further conform it to EAJA,t86 a persuasive argument could be made that Congress intended administrative
proceedings to be included within the term civil proceeding.
At the opposite extreme, the First and Fifth Circuits seem
ready to ignore altogether the narrow language that Congress
used to limit recovery under § 7430. 188 The Ninth Circuit in
156. See supra note 35.
157. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 127-131 and 148-151.
159. See supra note 35.
160. I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(B)(4) (Supp. 1985).
161. I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(B)(3) (Supp. 1985).
162. Ewing, 803 F.2d at 615.
163. Baker, 787 F.2d at 641-42.
164. The following factors support the conclusion that the legislature intended that
courts consider administrative conduct when deciding whether or not to award fees
under § 7430: (1) the legislative goals of deterring abuse and overreaching by the IRS
(see H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11); (2) the factors the committee suggested
courts use when considering awarding fees under § 7430 (see supra note 35 and accompanying text); and (3) the subsequent amendment of section 7430 to bring its language
closer to EAJA (see infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text).
165. See supra notes 183-190.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 63-67 and 73-82.
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Sliwa adopted the proximate cause reasoning of the Powell decision and then refined it to accommodate the narrow language of
section 7430. 167 By scrutinizing pre litigation conduct for reasonableness, the Ninth Circuit seeks to deter "abus[e] and overreaching" by the IRS.168 By only allowing recovery for those fees
incurred in and after preparing the petition, they limit recovery
as mandated by the statute's narrow language. 189

Congress passed section 7430 to give taxpayers a chance to
vindicate their rights against the IRS170 and to deter IRS
abuses. l7l However, they also drafted section 7430 in a way intended to deter spurious taxpayer suits 172 and to force taxpayers
to utilize fully the administrative appeals procedures of the
IRS.173 In so doing, Congress attempted to provide taxpayers
who had been abused by the system, rather than merely inconvenienced, with a way to vindicate their rights. Section 7430 was
intended to eliminate the situation in which an innocent taxpayer simply gives in and pays the deficiency because the expense of an appeal is more than the alleged deficiency.174
It is unjust, regardless of the interpretation of section 7430,
to allow the IRS to force a taxpayer to incur costs in the appeals
process and then concede its case without liability immediately
upon the filing of a legal action. Moreover, it is contrary to the
stated legislative intent and the spirit of section 7430. Yet this is
the conclusion reached by the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. For
courts to read section 7430 in such a restricted manner is to encourage the very abuse and overreaching which Congress sought
to deter by enacting the statute.

The Sliwa opinion came the closest to balancing the section's limiting language with its policy goals. 17II Unlike Kaufman,
167. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. "If [§ 7430) is to have any bite at all, courts must be permitted to look to
earlier conduct to determine whether the initial filing of a tax petition was provoked by
unreasonable conduct." Id.
169. Id.
170. See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 15.
173. Id. at 13.
174. See Schmalbeck & Myers, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules Under The
Internal Revenue Code, 1986 DUKE L.J. 970, 977-80 (1986).
.
175. Sliwa v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra text accom-
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which broadly held that courts may consider all prelitigation administrative conduct when deciding cost awards,I76 the Sliwa
opinion, like the Powell opinion, focuses on what caused the taxpayer to file suit. I77 Only the administrative conduct at the highest level, the level immediately prior to the filing of the suit,
may be considered by the court.I78 If that conduct was unreasonable and proximately caused the taxpayer to file suit, fees and
costs incurred in preparing and filing the petition may be
recovered. I79
This analysis enables taxpayers who are subjected to unreasonable conduct to file suit.I80 The proximate cause test may
also deter abusive conduct by administrative officers. They may
be encouraged to behave reasonably throughout the administrative procedures because, in the event an innocent taxpayer does
file suit, the courts will hold the IRS accountable for its
conduct. I81
IV. SECTION 7430 AS AMENDED BY THE 1986 TAX REFORM ACT
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress attempted to rectify section 7430's legislative shortcomings by amending those
sub-sections which had been the subject of the most controversy.I82 The first area of debate which Congress attempted to
settle was the controversy surrounding the reasonableness
panying notes 99-109.
176. Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985).
177. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also Powell, 791 F.2d at 391-92.
178. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also, Powell, 791 F.2d at 392.
179. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. See also Powell, 791 F.2d at 392.
180. Thus, the taxpayer is allowed to approach the prospect of litigation with the
IRS from a rational, moral aspect, rather than from a solely economic analysis. Id. at
392. See also Langsraat, Collecting Attorney Fees From The Government In Tax Litigation: An Analysis of the Winners And Prospects For The Future, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395
(1986) (discussing § 7430's effectiveness in compensating prevailing taxpayers).
181. One criticism of the deterrent effects of § 7430 is that it does not hold individual agents, who abuse their administrative positions, economically liable for their actions. See Award Of Attorney's Fees In Tax Cases, 1985: Hearings Before The Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the House of Representatives Comm. On Ways
And Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1985) (statement of Andy Jacobs Jr., Congressional
Rep. from Indiana).
182. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551, 100 Stat 2085, 2752-53 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 7430 (1987».
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test. 18S The test now, as provided in the amended section
7430(c)(2)(A)(i) is whether the government's conduct was "substantially justified. 1Il8'
The difference between the terms "substantially justified"
and "unreasonable" is largely one of degree. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit defined what constitutes
"substantial justification" in Washington v. Heckler.18G The
court stated, in the EAJA context, that to be substantially justified, one must prove: "(i) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts
alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounds;
and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and
the legal theory advanced."186 The legislative history of EAJA
employs the same type of parallels when it states "The test of
whether or not a Government action is substantially justified is
essentially one of reasonableness.1Il87 The problem is that a position can be reasonable, and still not be substantially justified by
the circumstances.
183. In the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress made four major changes in § 7430.
First, Congress changed the standard by which the government's position is to be evaluated. The former § 7430's previous language focused on whether the government's position was reasonable, whereas the new provision focuses on whether the government's
position was "substantially justified." I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) amended by
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1511(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (1986).
This language conforms with the corresponding language in EAJA, thus bolstering the
arguments that § 7430 and EAJA are analogous and should be interpreted uniformly.
Second, the administrative position taken by the IRS is now included in the evaluation of whether the government's position was substantially justified. I.R.C. § 7430
(c)(2)(A)(I) (1986). The statute's former language referred only to the government's "position ... in the civil proceeding," thus causing the controversy discussed supra. I.R.C. §
7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (1985).
Third, the maximum award for attorneys' fees has been set at $75 per hour and
reimbursement for expert testimony and preparation of expert reports, tests, etc., must
be based on market rates. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(I)(A)(ii)(I) (1986). The former maximum was
set at $25,000 in total costs. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(I)(A)(ii)(I) (Supp. 1985).
Finally, Congress imposed net worth limitations on the parties who are eligible for
fee reimbursements. Individuals having a net worth of less than $2,000,000 and entities
having a net worth of less than $7,000,000 are eligible for reimbursements. Taxpayers
with net worths over these amounts are not eligible for reimbursements. I.R.C. § 7430
(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1986).
184. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1985) amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1511(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (1986).
185. 756 F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1985).
186. [d. at 961.
187. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4989.
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The second area of confusion which Congress attempted to
clarify was the meaning of the phrase "position of the United
States in the civil proceeding.7!l88 The section was amended to
state: "The term 'position of the United States' includes - (A)
the position taken by the United States in the civil proceeding,
and (B) any administrative action or inaction by the District
Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service (and all subsequent administrative action or inaction) upon which such proceeding is
based. "189
This language roughly corresponds with the parallel language in EAJA, which was amended in 1985 by Congress to clarify what it meant by the "position of the United States."190 It
appears that Congress believed that adding similar language in
section 7430 would clarify what "position of the United States in
the civil proceeding" meant. Unfortunately, the injection of subparagraph (B) and its language regarding the presence of the
District Counsel clouds rather than clears the pre litigation conduct controversy.
Upon examination, a serious flaw in the amendment language becomes clear. Taxpayers, regardless of where they bring
suit, must request fees and costs under section 7430. 191 Yet, in
district courts or the Claims Court, where taxpayers sue the government for refunds from the IRS, District Counsel never enters
the case at all. The government is represented by the United
States Attorneys Office. Therefore, a truly literal reading of section 7430 would completely preclude district or Claims Court
judges from awarding litigation costs in tax cases.
It is, however, likely that Congress merely meant to use the
presence of District Counsel as an example of the sort of prelitigation administrative conduct for which the IRS should be accountable. In that case the word "includes" would be interpreted
to mean "including, but not limited to." If that is the case, an
analogy may be made to the position taken by the Fifth Circuit
in Powell. 192 The Fifth Circuit held that the position adopted at
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

1.R.C. § 7430(c)(4) (1986).
I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B) (1986).
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (Supp. 1987).
See HR REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 13.
Powell v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 385, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the highest administrative level, the position which proximately
caused the taxpayer to file the petition, was subject to scrutiny
for reasonableness. le3 The actions of District Counsel in its final
negotiations with the taxpayer are an excellent example of the
sort of administrative conduct the Fifth Circuit describes in
Powell. le•

v.

CONCLUSION

When drafting section 7430, the legislature was attempting
to balance two competing interests. First, the interest of taxpayers in knowing that, in the event the IRS takes an unreasonable
position regarding their tax liability, they can recover the costs
of defending themselves. lell Second, the interest of the Tax
Court and the IRS in discouraging spurious tax litigation and in
encouraging taxpayers to utilize the administrative procedures
of the IRS. l e6 Because of these competing interests, Congress altered the language of EAJA, the model statute, to accommodate
a narrower focus. Congress intended that it be more difficult for
taxpayers to recover fees under section 7430 than it was under
EAJA; it did not intend the narrower language to totally preclude taxpayers from ever receiving an award of litigation
costs. 197 The D.C. and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals' interpretation of section 7430 essentially allow such a result.
Section 7430's language allows taxpayer litigants to believe
that they will receive fees and costs if they prevail under the
statute. Nevertheless, a strict interpretation of the statute essentially precludes recovery. By allowing prelitigation administrative conduct to go unmonitored, this interpretation renders moot
the important policy goals of allowing innocent taxpayers to vindicate their rights and of deterring governmental abuse and
overreaching. les
Congress, through drafting and amending section 7430 to
correspond with EAJA, has consistently sought to implement
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

[d.
[d.
See H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 7, at 11.
[d.
[d. at 14.
[d. at 11.
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them analogously.199 The only discernible difference between the
two is section 7430's narrower scope. 200 While EAJA clearly favors the citizen litigant, section 7430 denies awards of litigation
costs unless the taxpayer has exhausted administrative remedies
and has been abused by the system. The analysis used by the
Ninth Circuit in Sliwa best balances the goals of discouraging
spurious tax litigation and allowing taxpayers an opportunity to
vindicate their rights if they are not liable.
This is accomplished by first requiring that taxpayers exhaust the administrative appeals system of the IRS before initiating a formal legal action. 20l The second goal of allowing taxpayers to vindicate their rights is aided by requiring that the
governmental position which caused the taxpayer to file suit be
"substantially justified."202 While requiring that governmental
positions be substantially justified, rather than merely "reasonable" as was required prior to the 1986 amendment, puts an additional burden on the administrative agents of the IRS: the fact
that the taxpayer must prove that the position was not substantially justified evens the balance.
The analysis used in Sliwa is consistent with legislative intent of section 7430 and with the spirit of the subsequent
amendment of the statute. Additionally, it answers the question
which the other Circuits left untouched. At what point in time
after the government adopts a substantially unjustified position
can a taxpayer rely on being awarded fees and costs under section 7430? The Ninth Circuit in Sliwa clearly stated that section
7430 mandated that only those costs incurred in and after preparing and filing the petition were recoverable under the
statute. 203
199. See H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 800-02, 799-802 (1986); S. REP. No.
313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 197-99 (1986).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28.
201. See I.R.C. § 7430 (b)(l) (1986).
202. See I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(2)(A)(i) (1986).
203. Sliwa, 839 F.2d at 607. The Ninth Circuit heard the case of Sponza v. Commissioner, No. 86-7432 (9th Cir. filed October 27, 1986), argued March 11, 1987 and, as of
this writing, has not delivered its opinion. Sponza is another last known address case in
which the IRS, after prolonged prelitigation administrative procedures, conceded the
case soon after the taxpayer filed a petition in Tax Court. The Ninth Circuit may use
Sponza to broaden their interpretation of section 7430 and actually delineate what administrative conduct is unreasonable.
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The analysis proposed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sliwa comes closest to actually implementing both the
letter of the law in section 7430 and the spirit in which the statute was drafted. This conclusion is strongly supported by the
1986 Tax Reform Act amendment of section 7430 which used
the administrative actions of District Counsel as one example of
administrative level conduct for which the IRS should be held
accountable. The 1986 amendments lend credibility to the conclusion that the First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits were correct in
interpreting section 7430 analogously with EAJA and in holding
the IRS accountable for its administrative conduct.
Dani Michele Miller*
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